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At last year's Fordham Corporate Law Institute, under the
heading "The Millennium Approaches,"1 I spoke about the chal-
lenges that European Community ("EC" or "Community") com-
petition law is facing or will face in the near future. I came to
the conclusion that the time has come for a re-examination and
modernization of our rules, in particular the implementing and
procedural legislation. I reached this conclusion based upon
three reasons.
First, a fundamental change is taking place in the environ-
ment in which EC competition law operates. This change is
driven not only by developments for which the Community itself
has opted, such as the single market and Economic and Mone-
tary Union ("EMU"), but also by conditions that are inevitably
imposed on us, such as the pressures of globalization and tech-
nological change.
Second, the accession of new Member States in the foresee-
able future becomes an ever more real prospect. In March 1998,
negotiations for accession were initiated with a first group of six
candidate countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Es-
tonia, Slovenia, and Cyprus). A further five countries (Romania,
Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania) are continuing their prepa-
rations with a view to opening accession negotiations at a later
stage.' Thus, a European Union with more than twenty-five
Member States is on the horizon. The first of our two main chal-
lenges will be how to bridge the enormous economic gap be-
tween old and new Member States and how to avoid market dis-
tortions between advanced free-market countries and those com-
* Director-General, Directorate General IV (Competition), European Commis-
sion. The author wishes to express particular gratitude to Rfidiger Dohms of Director-
ate General IV (Competition), who made an essential contribution to the preparation
of this Essay. A version of this Essay will appear in 1998 FoRDHam Cornu. L. INST. (Barry
Hawk ed., 1999). Copyright © Transnational Juris Publications, Inc., 1999.
1. Alexander Schaub, The Millenium Approaches, 1997 FORDHAM CoRP. L. INST.
(Barry Hawk ed., 1998).
2. Moreover, Malta has recently revived its application for membership.
854 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:853
pleting their transition to a market economy. The second main
challenge is that our institutional and procedural laws, which
were designed for a much smaller Community, will have to un-
dergo an overhaul in order to keep the system workable and to
allow the integration process to continue.
Third, there are new legal developments inside and outside
the Community. The enforcement of competition principles
has become more effective in most of the Member States. Na-
tional competition laws are being set up or being reformed so as
to be more efficient. Credible national competition authorities
have been established, and there is increasing application of EC
competition law not only by national courts, but also by national
competition authorities. Moreover, growing interdependence
between the European Union and third countries brings us into
contact with their competition law and enforcement practice
and makes necessary the conclusion of bilateral as well as multi-
lateral agreements.
I. THE BASIC ORIENTATION OF OUR REFORM EFFORTS
Let me say some words about the basic orientation of our
reform efforts. EC competition law operates in five main areas:
(1) the control of Restrictive agreements and Abuses of domi-
nant positions under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community' ("EC Treaty"); (2) Merger Con-
trol; (3) Liberalization under Article 90;4 (4) State aid control;
and (5) International cooperation. While these different areas
cannot be treated in all respects in the same way, the basic orien-
tation of our reform efforts applies to all of them, albeit to sub-
stantially varying degrees. This basic orientation is to achieve
several objectives that are closely inter-related. I think that it is
useful to briefly describe these objectives before I turn to their
implementation in the different areas of EC competition law.
3. See Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, arts. 85, 86, O.J.
C 224/1, at 28-29 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 626-28 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incor-
porating changes made by Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719. The Treaty on European Union amended the Treaty establish-
ing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, as amended by
Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741.
4. See id. art. 90, OJ. C 224/1, at 29-30 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 629.
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A. Our First Basic Orientation: The Commission Has to Concentrate
on the Essentials
1. What Are the Essentials?
Our experience shows that the essential issues that should
be treated by the Commission at the European level cannot sim-
ply be defined on the basis of the criteria that determine
whether Community law is applicable or not. In other words,
not every competition issue that involves effects on trade be-
tween Member States (in Article 85/86 and State aid cases) or
for which the thresholds under the Merger Regulation' are met,
necessarily and under all circumstances has to be dealt with in
Brussels. Where certain requirements are met some of these
cases can be dealt with at least as effectively by national authori-
ties and/or national courts. The reasons to keep the treatment
of these cases on the national level are twofold: we want to en-
sure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens,
and we recognize that the objectives pursued by EC competition
law could not be better achieved if EC institutions dealt with
these cases. This means that the criteria for identifying the es-
sential competition issues and cases on which the Commission
should concentrate follow the notions of subsidiarity and pro-
portionality, more recently introduced in Article 3b of the
Treaty establishing the European Community.6 I do not intend
to elaborate any further here on the question of whether these
principles are exclusively or mainly designed for legislative ac-
tion. The underlying ideas certainly also have a meaning for
sensibly defining the roles that the Commission, national author-
ities, and courts should play in the enforcement of EC competi-
tion law. Consequently, the Commission should concentrate on
those cases in which it can produce better results in terms of
achieving the objectives of EC competition law as well as provid-
ing guidance and legal security within short, efficient, and trans-
parent procedures. Thereby, we would provide an added value
in comparison with national authorities or courts.
5. Council Regulation No. 4064/89 on control of concentrations between under-
takings, O.J. L 395/1 (1989), corrected version in O.J. L 257/13 (1990), amended by Coun-
cil Regulation No. 1310/97, O.J. L 180/1 (1997), corrigendum O.J. L 40/17 (1998)
[hereinafter Merger Regulation].
6. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 3b, O.J. C 224/1, at 9 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 590.
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2. How Can the Commission Better Concentrate on
These Essentials?
For the Commission to concentrate on the essentials, basi-
cally, three things, which go hand in hand, are needed. First,
wherever possible, we need more decentralized application of
the EC competition rules, but without jeopardizing coherence.
This is mainly, but not exclusively, a matter for the enforcement
of Articles 85 and 86. State aid and merger control, however,
should not, in principle, be excluded from any decentralization.
Therefore, certain (though still limited) elements of decentrali-
zation can be found in our concept for competition policy devel-
opment in these two areas.
Second, adequate devices have to be found to free the Com-
mission from unnecessary notifications. The Commission must
regain the possibility to pursue a more proactive approach. By
spending less time reacting to notifications that are of little inter-
est from a policy point of view, it will have more time to deal with
serious restrictions of competition, in particular those cases that
it has chosen to take up either ex officio or following a complaint.
The Commission will thereby gain space to set its own priorities
rather than have an agenda imposed on it by an excessively rigid
system of compulsory or quasi-compulsory notifications.
Third, less a priori and more a posteriori control must be es-
tablished. More decentralization as well as securing a more
proactive role for the Commission will lead to, and at the same
time call for, reducing the amount of a priori control in favor of
more a posteriori control. This a posteriori control will be exer-
cised not only by the Commission but also to an increasing ex-
tent by national bodies. Where appropriate, this tendency
should be promoted by further measures.
B. Our Second Basic Orientation: The Reformed System Must Ensure
More Efficient Enforcement ,
This means that we have to strive for: (1) more efficient
procedures; (2) a greater number of decision-makers applying
EC competition rules; and (3) a network among these decision-
makers.
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C. Our Third Basic Orientation: The Reformed System Must
Guarantee a Coherent Application of the Rules and a
Reasonable Level of Legal Certainty for the
Benefit of Economic Operators
In a system with different decision-makers, special provision
has to be made for coherent treatment of similar cases and other
aspects of legal certainty. Consequently, there should be: (1)
only one set of substantive rules for cases with effect on interstate
trade; (2) guidance on the interpretation of these rules provided
by central bodies; and (3) centralized judicial review.
II. THE APPLICATION OF THESE BASIC ORIENTATIONS OF
REFORM IN DIFFERENT AREAS OF EC
COMPETITION LAW
Merger control and liberalization under Article 90 of the
EC Treaty are currently running quite smoothly. These areas of
EC Competition law will not be the subjects of major reforms in
the immediate future. In the sphere of international relations,
the task is not to reform an existing concept, but to develop a
system for the first time through bilateral and multilateral com-
petition agreements. Consequently, in view of the challenges
that I described in the beginning, our priority areas of reform on
which we are currently concentrating are State aid and the en-
forcement of Articles 85 and 86.
A. State Aid
1. The Objectives and the Projects
For the modernization of State aid control, two reform
projects are most significant. These are the introduction of
group exemptions and the codification of the Commission's
State aid control procedures.
Both projects have made some progress during the last
twelve months. In the field of group exemptions, the Council
has accepted the Commission's proposal and on May 7, 1998,
adopted an enabling regulation 7 on the basis of Article 94 of the
7. Council Regulation No. 994/98 on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the
Treaty establishing the European Community to certain categories of horizontal State
aid, OJ. L 142/1 (1998).
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EC Treaty.8 This regulation empowers the Commission to adopt
group exemption regulations for certain categories of State aid.
The Commission is currently drafting its first group exemption
regulation, which will cover state aid to small and medium size
enterprises ("SMEs"). With regard to codifying the Commis-
sion's State aid control procedures, on February 24, 1998, the
Commission issued a proposal for a Council regulation,9 which is
also based on Article 94. We hope that the Council will reach an
agreement on the proposal in November. 0
The objectives of' the modernization exercise that we have
begun in the State aid sector are: (1) to increase the effective-
ness of State aid control; (2) to enable the Commission to con-
centrate on the essential and important cases; and (3) to im-
prove transparency and legal certainty. With the prospect of en-
largement of the European Union, we need to streamline, to
simplify, and to clarify procedures, thus helping the candidate
countries to align their legislation with Community law as well as
helping the Commission to deal with the additional workload
that will result from the accession of these countries.
2. The Instrument of Regulations Based on Article 94 of the
EC Treaty
The fact that the Commission has made the basic decision
to use Article 94 of the EC Treaty as the legal basis for the mod-
ernization of State aid control constitutes a major change in its
position. For the pursuit of its reform projects, the Commission
could have stuck to its traditional instruments such as
frameworks, guidelines, notices, and communications. These
have proven to be of considerable value for stating the Commis-
sion's interpretation of substantive and procedural issues. These
instruments, however, cannot provide the required legal cer-
tainty, and in some areas their large number has not led to more
8. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 94, O.J. C 224/1, at 31 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 631-32.
9. Commission proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) laying down detailed rules
for the application of Article 93 of the Treaty establishing the European Community,
O.J. C 116/13 (1998).
10. In fact, the Industry Council of 16 November 1998 reached a political agree-
ment on the regulation on State aid procedures. The European Parliament delivered
its opinion on January 14, 1999. The Council finally adopted the regulation on March
22, 1999 (No. 659/1999). It has been published in O.J. L 83/1 (1999) and has entered
into force on April 16, 1999.
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transparency in the end. The Commission, therefore, thinks
that the route of formal secondary legislation, which it is now
pursuing with caution, can be a more appropriate way to ensure
the required transparency and legal certainty. This strategy in-
volved a certain risk that once a proposal was submitted to the
Council, it was out of the Commission's control and the very
wide powers that the EC Treaty conferred upon the Commission
could be reduced. On the other hand, at the end of the 1990s,
the Commission's State aid policy is well-established and has the
support of the Court of Justice, and it can be expected that
Member States generally accept the Commission's powers. So
far, the Commission's strategy has worked well and the Council
has fully respected its powers in the ongoing modernization pro-
cess.
3. Group Exemptions for State Aid
a. The Mass Problem
The Commission faces an ever-increasing number of notifi-
cations of State aid cases. We lose too much time in examining
notifications of State aids that are obviously compatible with the
Common Market. In numerous frameworks and guidelines the
Commission has laid down concrete criteria for the compatibility
of aid, and Member States increasingly draft their aid schemes in
line with this guidance. Under these circumstances, the added
value of a Commission decision confirming that the published
criteria have been met is very limited. The formalism of carrying
out notification procedures in these cases, however, has a sub-
stantial impact on the Commission's resources and obviously
also on those of the Member States. Moreover, it prevents the
Commission from concentrating on larger, more complex, and
more distorting cases. Against this backdrop, the Commission
considered a simplification of procedures appropriate where its
level of experience allowed it to define precise compatibility cri-
teria and where it could be observed that Member States gener-
ally respected these published criteria. Both conditions are gen-
erally met in the area of horizontal aid. The enabling Regula-
tion adopted by the Council empowers the Commission to issue
group exemption regulations concerning State aid for SMEs, re-
search and development (or "R&D"), environmental protection,
employment, and training as well as for regional aid. The Com-
1999] 859
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mission has to attach to any group exemption' regulation
mandatory conditions relating to admissible purposes of aid, cat-
egories of beneficiaries, admissible thresholds, cumulation of
aid, and conditions of monitoring. The approach and contents
of the forthcoming group exemption regulations will mainly fol-
low the lines of existing practice and to a large extent translate
the criteria of the guidelines and frameworks into the more ef-
fective and reliable legal form of a regulation.
In terms of simplification of procedures, group exemption
regulations will not only have the advantage of liberating the
Commission of a large number of notification procedures in
routine cases, but also free the Member States from the adminis-
trative burden of notification and allow them to award aid,
which is covered by a regulation, immediately and without a
standstill period. Outside the scope of the group exemption reg-
ulations, the traditional notification procedure will continue to
apply.
b. Decentralization
State aid control is the area where, under the present cir-
cumstances, there are the clearest limits to decentralization. In
particular, the entrustment of administrative State aid control to
the authorities of the Member States would not be advisable.
Due to the conflict of interests, into which probably even a sepa-
rate national supervisory body would run, it cannot be expected
that the national level would provide equally effective or even
better control than the Commission. Under the present system
there is also limited scope for direct applicability of State aid
rules by the national courts. In fact, only the standstill clause
laid down in the last sentence of Article 93(3) of the EC Treaty11
is directly applicable. Following an action brought by an inter-
ested party against the grant of State aid, a national court can at
present only state that the subsidy is a State aid in the sense of
Article 92 of the EC Treaty. 12 In case the grant has not been
notified to the Commission, the national court has to take all
appropriate measures, including an order for recovery, so that
the status quo ante is reestablished.
11. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 93(3) O.J. C 224/1, at 31 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 631.
12. See id. art. 92, O.J. C 224/1, at 30 .(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 630.
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Due to the direct applicability of group exemption regula-
tions, these regulations will grant more responsibility to national
bodies. National authorities will have to monitor themselves in
order to ensure that their aid schemes are within the limits of a
group exemption regulation. And national courts, upon actions
brought against the aid, will be able to decide the case and to
dismiss the action if they are convinced that the conditions of a
group exemption regulation are fulfilled. In this sense, block
exemption regulations will contribute to decentralization.
c. Limited Shift to A Posteriori Control
A significant consequence of group exemption regulations
is that, within their scope of application, they shift the current a
priori control on the basis of notifications to the Commission to
an a posteriori control of whether the conditions for exemption
have been respected. Such a posteriori control is not exclusively
exercised by the Commission. It can also be carried out by na-
tional courts. Within the scope of the group exemption regula-
tions, a priori control will also become self-control to be exer-
cised by the national authorities insofar as they themselves have
to check whether their aid schemes comply with the conditions
of the relevant regulation. Outside the group exemption regula-
tions, the Commission's traditional a priori control will continue
to apply.
Fears that the new group exemption element in the system
might weaken the control of State aid are unfounded. The Com-
mission has not only the means to model a group exemption
regulation according to the specific problems involved in a cer-
tain category of aid. It will also keep the power to amend a regu-
lation where necessary. Moreover, provision has been made that
the a posteriori control of whether the conditions for a group ex-
emption are met shall be as effective as the previous notification
system, though less bureaucratic. By way of summary reports,
Member States will have to keep the Commission informed
about their application of the group exemption regulation. In
case of doubt or following a complaint, the Commission will be
able to require the Member State to submit all information nec-
essary to verify compliance with the exemption. Third parties
who suspect that State aid granted without notification to the
Commission does not fulfil the conditions for exemption not
only can complain to the Commission but also can seek clarifica-
1999]
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tion at the national level. They can bring an action against the
State in the national courts, invoking the prohibition under Arti-
cle 92(1) of the EC Treaty13 as well as the non-applicability of the
group exemption regulation.
d. De Minimis Rule
The enabling regulation also provides for a legal basis upon
which the Commission can establish a threshold-related de
minimis rule. This rule was previously only defined in a notice.
Below the thresholds, a subsidy will not be considered to consti-
tute a State aid in the sense of Article 92 (1)14 and therefore not
require notification.
4. The Regulation on State Aid Procedures
The Commission's proposal for a procedural regulation
aims at improving transparency and legal certainty in State aid
procedures by bringing the procedural rules together in one co-
herent and binding legal text. At present, Article 93 of the EC
Treaty15 is the only legal provision on procedures. On the basis
of this article, a set of rules has been developed through both
the Commission's practice and the case law of the Court of Jus-
tice. Where important procedural issues have arisen or been
clarified, the Commission has issued notices and communica-
tions, normally published in the Official Journal. Legally speak-
ing, these texts contained no more than an interpretation by the
Commission of certain procedural questions and did not provide
legal certainty apart from possible self-binding effects. More-
over, the piecemeal fashion in which procedures developed re-
sulted in a fragmentation of rules that reduced the clarity of the
system provided for in the Treaty. While aiming to make the
rules transparent, the multiplication of interpretative texts fi-
nally created less transparency. Integration of the procedural
rules into one coherent text was thus required.
The second objective of the procedural regulation is to rein-
force the efficiency of State aid control. The Commission's long-
standing experience has revealed some weak points in the sys-
13. See id. art. 92(1), O.J. C 224/1, at 30 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 630.
14. Therefore, strictly speaking, the de minimis rule is not a group exemption for
State aid.
15. See id. art. 93, O.J. 224/1, at 31 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 631.
EC COMPETITION SYSTEM
tem, in particular with regard to unlawful aid and recovery. In
order to provide the Commission with all the necessary means to
ensure effective control, the proposal seeks to enlarge the con-
trol system with some new instruments such as recovery injunc-
tions against unlawfully paid aid or on-site visits to beneficiaries
of aid.
B. Merger Control
1. The Amendment of the Merger Regulation of
March 1, 1998
Our experience with the amended Merger Regulation in
the first six months has been positive though limited. There
were eight additional cases as a result of the new thresholds,
which will lead up to approximately fifteen to twenty additional
cases per year. The number of notified. mergers has increased
significantly since the Merger Regulation came into force in
1990 (about fifty cases yearly in the early years to 170 cases in
1997 and probably 200 cases in 1998). Nevertheless, the addi-
tional increase following the amendment of the Regulation (Ar-
ticle 1 (3))16 was felt to be acceptable for reasons of subsidiarity.
The principle of subsidiarity is not a one-way road. The new sys-
tem of an additional set of lower turnover thresholds aims at
avoiding multiple notifications of one and the same concentra-
tion in different Member States and thus has the same aim as the
original threshold, i.e., to avoid multiple control in different
Member States and to centralize the treatment of such cases in
Brussels. The justification for this new system is that such an
operation can, in terms of length and cost of procedure, be bet-
ter dealt with on the European level.
As regards full function joint ventures, all of them are now
treated as concentrations under Article 3 (2) of the Merger Regu-
lation, and they are therefore dealt with under the procedures of
that regulation. Where the creation of such a joint venture has
as its object or effect the coordination of the competitive beha-
viour of undertakings that remain independent, the amended
Regulation (Article 2(4)) now subjects such cooperative spill-
over to an appraisal under the criteria of Articles 85(1) and
85(3) of the EC Treaty for establishing whether the operation is
16. See Merger Regulation, supra note 5, 0.J. L 40/17 (1998).
1999] 863
864 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:853
compatible with the Common Market. In the first six months,
spill-over aspects were considered in eight cases, all of which
ended with authorizations because there were no serious doubts
as to the compatibility with'the Common Market.17 In all these
cases, the Commission came to the conclusion that Article 85(1)
was not applicable because there was no appreciable restriction
of competition. The test of how well the appreciation of spill-
over aspects really functions is still to come. It will take place
when a restriction in the sense of Article 85(1)18 is found to exist
and Article 85(3) has to be assessed. As far as the allocation of
tasks inside Directorate General IV is concerned, where a full
function joint venture entails the possibility of cooperative spill-
over, the assessment of the entire operation under the Merger
Regulation is carried out by the sectoral unit that is in charge of
applying Article 85 in the relevant sector.
2. Referrals, by the Commission to a National
Competition Authority
The reform of March 1, 1998 has also enlarged the possibili-
ties for the Commission under Article 9 of the Merger Regula-
tion 19 to refer a case to a national competition authority where
the effects of the concentration are felt on a market within this
Member State that presents all the characteristics of a distinct
market. After initial hesitation, the Commission has since 1996
used this provision more frequently. Due to the reform, this
trend will probably continue. The referral of a concentration
allows the inherent rigidity of the threshold system to be miti-
gated and, in line with subsidiarity, can be used to allow Member
States to deal with cases that could not be handled better at the
European level.
3. Possible Reforms in the Long Run
While Directorate General IV is able at the moment to deal
with all notified mergers, the accession of new Member States
and the further integration of European markets will certainly
bring about an increase in notifications to the Commission. The
17. See Council Regulation No. 4064/89, 0J. L 395/1 (1989), corrected version in
O.J. L 257/13 (1990).
18. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 85(1), O.J. C 224/1, at 28 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 626.
19. See Merger Regulation, supra note 5, 0.J. L 40/17 (1998).
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ECU250 million threshold for Community turnover will be more
easily attained and the likelihood that the current two thirds rule
is applicable will decrease. This could make it increasingly diffi-
cult for the Commission to handle all notified cases with the re-
quired care while respecting the tight time limits under the
Merger Regulation. Article 1(4) of the Merger Regulation 21
obliges the Commission to report to the Council on the opera-
tion of the thresholds and criteria set out in Article 1 (2) and (3)
of the Regulation before July 1, 2000.21 Moreover, Article 9(10)
states that the provisions on referral of cases to Member States
may be re-examined at the same time'. The Commission is there-
fore in any event obliged to reflect upon these two key elements
that define jurisdiction. On the one hand, this exercise does not
necessarily have to lead to any reform of the current system if
there is no objective need. On the other hand, if a need for
reform is found, it will not necessarily have to be confined to the
aspect of jurisdiction. All will depend on the nature of any defi-
ciencies that the current system might reveal in the future. The
Commission could then use its July 2000 report to the Council as
an opportunity to introduce into the discussion any options re-
lating to jurisdiction or to procedure and substance of the exam-
ination under the Merger Regulation that seem appropriate for
solving the problems.
C. International Cooperation
International cooperation in competition matters is the lo-
gical consequence of globalization. The first priority is to coor-
dinate competition authorities' actions in cases of world market
scale. Another important objective, which requires some perse-
verance, is to establish international rules, to ensure their en-
forceability, and thereby to provide more legal certainty on the
international level. These objectives are matters to be pursued
in bilateral relationships, such as between the European Union
and the United States, as well as in international organizations,
in particular the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (the "OECD") and the World Trade Organization
(the "WTO").
20. See id. 0.J. L 40/17 (1998).
21. Id.
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1. The Bilateral EU-US Relationship
The Agreement Between the Government of the United
States and the Commission of the European Communities re-
garding the Application of their Competition Laws22 (the "1991
EU-US Competition Cooperation Agreement") is currently work-
ing smoothly. In the last twelve months, it has played a role in
several cases, out of which the WorldCom/MCI merger 21 was
probably the most important. The Commission's investigations,
and negotiations of remedies, were undertaken in parallel with
the examination of the case by the U.S. Department of Justice
(the "DOJ"). The process was marked by close cooperation be-
tween the two authorities, including exchanges of views on the
analytical method to be used, coordination of information gath-
ering, and joint meetings and negotiations with the parties. Af-
ter the parties had undertaken to divest MCI's Internet assets,
thus eliminating the overlap with WorldCom's Internet business,
the operation received clearance from the Commission and
from the DOJ in July 1998. Following the divestiture of the rele-
vant business to Cable&Wireless, the merger was put into effect
shortly thereafter. The WorldCom/MCI case constitutes a good
example of using the elements of traditional comity, which the
1991 EU-US Competition Cooperation Agreement contains.
Traditional comity aims at bringing the respective positions that
competition authorities on both sides hold and the remedies
that they seek together so as to avoid creating a harmful effect to
the market of the partner.
Positive comity goes beyond this and enables one side ad-
versely affected by anticompetitive conduct carried out in the
other's territory to request the other side's competition author-
ity to take enforcement action. While the 1991 EU-US Competi-
tion Cooperation Agreement already contained a few elements
of this principle, it soon appeared that certain conflicts could be
avoided by using the positive comity concept more extensively.
Our efforts to strengthen the relevant provisions of the 1991 EU-
US Competition Cooperation Agreement have now led to the
22. Agreement between the government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities regarding the application of their competi-
tion laws, O.J. L 95/45 (1991), corrected version in OJ. L 131/38 (1995).
23. WorldCom/MCI (II) case M.1069, adopted on July 8, 1998.
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1998 EU-US Positive Comity Agreement, 24 which entered into
force in June 1998. This agreement, like the 1991 EU-US Com-
petition Cooperation Agreement, does not alter existing law, nor
does it require any change in existing law. It does, however, cre-
ate a presumption that when anticompetitive activities occur in
the whole, or in a substantial part, of the territory of one of the
parties and affect the interests of the other party, the latter "will
normally defer or suspend its enforcement activities in favour of'
the former. This is expected to happen particularly when these
anti-competitive activities do not have a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable impact on consumers in the territory of
the party deferring or suspending its activities. Deferral will only
occur if the party in the territory of which the restrictive activities
are occurring has jurisdiction over these activities and is pre-
pared to deal actively and expeditiously with the matter. When
dealing with the case, that party will keep its counterpart closely
informed of any developments in the procedure, within the lim-
its of its internal rules protecting confidentiality. We hope that
implementation of the 1998 agreement will turn positive comity
into the principle clearly to be preferred against stretching one's
own competition law towards extraterritorial application.
In the future, the European Union will seek to intensify its
cooperation with the United States and--where possible-to es-
tablish similar cooperation agreements with other important
countries or trading blocks. The recent wave of mega mergers
in oligopolistic world markets is only the most prominent exam-
ple underlining the need for a network of effective bilateral co-
operation. Moreover, it points to an increasing need for multi-
lateral action and international competition rules.
2. The Multilateral Perspective
We believe that multilateral organizations should play an in-
creasing role in providing instruments for regulatory and case
specific cooperation. From this perspective, we welcome the
OECD Recommendation on Competition Cooperation as last re-
vised in 1995.25 A further step has now been made by the 1998
24. Agreement between the European Communities and the government of the
United States of America on the application of positive comity principles in the enforce-
ment of their competition laws, OJ. L 173/28 (1998).
25. OECD Revised Recommendation of the Council Concerning Cooperation Be-
tween Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International
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OECD Recommendation on Hard Core Cartels. 26 It aims at im-
proving the effectiveness and efficiency of OECD members' law
enforcement against hard core cartels by eliminating or reduc-
ing statutory exceptions that create gaps in the coverage of com-
petition law and by removing the legal restrictions that deny
competition agencies the authorization to provide investigative
assistance to foreign competition agencies.
Strengthening bilateral and multilateral cooperation, how-
ever, will not solve all the problems created by the increasing
number of global competition cases. The Commission is there-
fore convinced that we need a set of binding international com-
petition rules and that the WTO is the appropriate body in
which they should be elaborated. The advantages of interna-
tional rules are evident and can be briefly summarized. First,
they can be part of a strategy on market access overcoming ex-
clusionary anticompetitive practices. Second, they promote
gradual convergence of national competition laws. Third, they
help to avoid unnecessary duplication of work and costs. While
our U.S. colleagues still remain hesitant, we are confident that
we will be able to convince them of the benefits of this approach.
3. The Relationship Between the European Union and Its
Future Member States in Central and Eastern Europe
The competition rules prevailing between the European
Union and the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope are contained in bilateral agreements. They are part of the
so-called Europe Agreements,27 which concern a broader set of
policies. The Europe Agreements tackle a number of competi-
tion issues directly through explicit provisions, but they also go
further than that by containing a clause on approximation of
legislation. These two aspects clearly illustrate the idea that lib-
eralization of trade goes in parallel with adopting regulations in
the field of competition. More generally, it fits into the philoso-
phy that governments are required to enforce competition rules
Trade, OECD Doc. C (86) 44/Final (May 21, 1986), replaced by C (95) 130/Final (July
28, 1995).
26. OECD Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against
Hard Core Cartels, OECD Doc. C (98) 35/Final (Apr. 28, 1998).
27. In the period between 1991 and 1996, the European Union has concluded
such agreements with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithua-
nia, Latvia, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria.
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in their countries as a condition for being admitted as players in
a globalized economy.
III. THE MOST SENSITIVE REFORM: THE ENFORCEMENT OF
ARTICLES 85 AND 86
The other major area of reform to which the Commission
will have to turn, in view of the challenges described above, is
the way that We interpret and, in particular, the way in which we
should enforce Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty.28 The start-
ing point for the Commission in this area is that changes of the
EC Treaty are not necessary and in any case for the foreseeable
future not possible. The reforms to come will therefore not be a
matter for an intergovernmental conference but for the compe-
tent Community institutions themselves to propose and to de-
cide. The instruments of reform will be not only formal secon-
dary legislation, but also interpretative guidelines, simple
changes in practice, and increased involvement of national bod-
ies.
A. Ongoing Reforms
The most important projects currently under way concern
vertical restraints and horizontal cooperation agreements.
1. Vertical Restraints
a. Substance
On September 30, 1998, the Commission adopted a Com-
munication on the application of the EC competition rules to
vertical restraints. 9 This Communication is a policy paper,
which, in essence, recommends a shift from the current legalistic
approach relying on form-based requirements with sector spe-
cific rules to an economic effects-based system covering virtually
all sectors of distribution.3 ° It is proposed that this shift be
achieved by one single block exemption regulation, which is
28. See EC Treaty, supra, note 3, arts. 85, 86, O.J. C 224/1, at 28-29 (1992), [1992]
1 C.M.L.R. at 626-28.
29. European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the Applica-
tion of the Community Competition Rules to Vertical Restraints - Follow-up to the
Green Paper on Vertical Restraints, COM (98) 522 Final (Sept. 30, 1998).
30. The Block Exemption Regulation on car distribution, which expires in 2002, is
not covered by the current proposal.
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wider than the present ones and which will cover all vertical re-
straints concerning intermediate and final goods and services.
The block exemption will be based mainly on a black clause ap-
proach, i.e., defining what is not block-exempted instead of de-
fining what is exempted. This approach will remove the strait-
jacket effect, a structural flaw inherent in any system that at-
tempts to identify clauses that are exempted.
The principal objective of such a wide and flexible block
exemption regulation is to grant companies that lack market
power-and most companies do lack market power-a safe ha-
ven within which it is no longer necessary for them to assess the
validity of their vertical agreements under the EC competition
rules. In order to preserve competition and to limit the benefit
of this exemption to companies that do not have significant mar-
ket power, the block exemption will establish market share
thresholds, beyond which companies cannot avail themselves of
the safe haven.
For companies with market shares above the thresholds of
the block exemption, it must be stressed that there will not be
any presumption of illegality concerning their vertical agree-
ments. The market share threshold will only serve to distinguish
those agreements that are presumed to be legal from those that
may require individual examination. To assist companies in car-
rying out such an examination, the Commission intends to issue
a set of guidelines covering basically two issues: first, the applica-
tion of Articles 85(1) and 85(3) above the market share cap; and
second, the Commission's policy of withdrawal of the benefit of
the block exemption, particularly in cumulative effect cases.
Such guidelines should allow companies to make in most cases
their own assessment under Article 85(1) and (3). The objective
is to reduce the enforcement costs for industry and to eliminate
as far as possible notifications of agreements that do not raise
any serious competition problem.
With regard to the use of market share caps, the Commis-
sion has in its policy paper not yet decided between a system
based on one or two thresholds. In a two-threshold system, the
first and main market share cap would be twenty percent. Below
this, it is assumed that vertical restraints have no significant net
negative effects and therefore all vertical restraints and their
combinations, with the exception of specified hardcore re-
straints, are exempted. Above the twenty percent threshold,
EC COMPETITION SYSTEM
there is room to exempt certain vertical restraints up to a higher
level of forty percent. This second threshold would cover verti-
cal restraints that, on the basis of economic thinking and past
policy experience, lead to less serious restrictions of competi-
tion. In this category would fall, for example, exclusive distribu-
tion mitigated by the possibility of passive sales and non-exclu-
sive types of arrangements such as quantity forcing on the buyer
as well as agreements between SMEs. A two-threshold system has
the advantage of providing for an economically justified gradua-
tion in the treatment of vertical restraints. The principal draw-
back of such a system is its complexity and the risk of reintroduc-
ing formalistic criteria for the identification and definition of
the individual vertical restraints covered by the higher threshold.
In a one-threshold system, all vertical restraints and their
combinations, with the exception of hardcore restraints, are au-
tomatically exempted up to the level of a single market share
cap. The level of such a cap has not been settled, but it will have
to be below forty percent, the level at which single market domi-
nance may start. It is likely to be in the range of twenty-five to
thirty percent. The advantage of a single-threshold system arises
from its simplicity, there being no necessity to define specific
vertical restraints other than hardcore.
The category of blacklisted hardcore vertical restraints,
which will not be block-exempted under any of the models just
described, will in any event contain minimum and fixed resale
price maintenance as well as agreements leading to absolute ter-
ritorial protection. In its policy paper, the Commission also pro-
poses to protect the possibility for arbitrage by both in-
termediaries and final consumers to a wider extent. The exact
content of the hardcore list, however, is being left open at the
moment.
As a result, due to the scope of the new block exemption
regulation, which will be wider than the current ones taken to-
gether, the Commission will in the field of vertical restraints be
liberated from a large part of its current work on individual noti-
fications. The target is to have the new block exemption regula-
tion in force by the year 2000.
1999]
872, FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:853
b. Implementation
i. Extending the Scope of the Enabling Regulation No. 19/65
Council Regulation No. 19/65,31 which enables the Com-
mission to issue block exemption regulations, does not provide a
sufficient basis for the new policy on vertical restraints. In its
current form, the enabling regulation only allows the Commis-
sion to issue block exemptions with respect to bilateral exclusive
supply or purchase agreements concluded with a view to resale
of the goods concerned or agreements comprising restrictions
on the acquisition or use of intellectual property rights. The
Commission has now proposed to the Council to extend the
scope of the enabling regulation so that block exemption regula-
tions can cover all types of vertical agreements concluded be-
tween two or more firms, each operating at a different stage of
the economic process. In fact, it will be possible to cover vertical
agreements concluded in respect of the supply and/or purchase
of goods for resale or processing or in respect of the marketing
of services, including exclusive distribution agreements, exclu-
sive purchasing agreements, franchising agreements and selec-
tive distribution agreements, and combinations thereof.
Finally, the proposed amendment of Council Regulation
No. 19/6532 will allow for decentralized withdrawal of the bene-
fit of a group exemption regulation. Accordingly, where group-
exempted vertical agreements or concerted practices create ef-
fects incompatible with Article 85(3) and these effects are felt in
a Member State that possesses all the characteristics of a distinct
market, the competent national authority will have the power to
withdraw the benefit of the block exemption in its territory and
to adopt a decision aimed at eliminating those effects. Instead
of bringing a complaint to the Commission, third parties will in
these cases turn to the national authorities.
The new block exemption regulation will increase decen-
tralization in yet another way. Under the existing system, there
is no scope for national competition authorities to apply Article
85(1) if the companies draft their agreements in accordance
with the group exemption regulations. Even companies with
31. Council Regulation No. 19/65/EEC of the Council on application of Article
85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices, 36J.0.
533 (1965), Oj. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1965-66 at 35.
32. Id.
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strong market power and market shares up to 100% are ex-
empted. Under the new system, above the market share cap of
the block exemption regulation, there will be new space for na-
tional competition authorities to apply Article 85(1) in individ-
ual cases.
ii. Extending the Waiver from Prior Notification Granted by
Article 4(2) of Regulation 17
The Commission also proposes to extend the scope of Arti-
cle 4(2) of Regulation 17"3 with a view to granting a waiver from
the prior notification requirement under Article 4(1) 4 in re-
spect of all vertical agreements. According to Article 6(1) of
Regulation 17,11 the rule is that an exemption decision by the
Commission cannot take effect before the date of the notifica-
tion. In contrast to that, for agreements falling under Article
4(2) of Regulation 17, Article 6(2) enables the Commission to
allow the exemption take effect from the date of conclusion of
the agreement.
The proposed inclusion of all vertical agreements within Ar-
ticle 4(2) will have several beneficial effects. First, where a com-
pany has made a mistake in the assessment of its market share
and is not covered by the block exemption, the Commission will
be able to exempt retroactively to the date of conclusion of the
agreement, provided all the conditions of Article 85(3) were ful-
filled from the beginning. Second, artificial litigation before na-
tional courts, where the competition rules are often invoked to
escape from contractual obligations even though there is no real
competition problem, will be eliminated. Where exemption de-
cisions can take effect from the date of conclusion of the agree-
ment and not only from the date of its notification, there is no
longer an incentive to litigate about agreements, which are
caught by Article 85 (1) but exemptible, with the intention of ex-
ploiting their nullity for the period between conclusion and noti-
fication. The proposed reform will therefore strengthen the
civil enforceability of contracts by putting the emphasis on pro-
33. Council Regulation No. 17/62, art. 4(2), 13.O. 204 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 1959-62, at 87, 88 (First Regulation implementing articles 85 & 86 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community).
34. Id. art. 4(1), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 88.
35. Id. art. 6(2), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 89.
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tection of competition instead of protection of private interests
often unrelated to competition.
Third, the number of notifications presently made with a
view to obtaining legal security will diminish. Companies can
first make their own assessment under Articles 85(1) and (3)
and avoid the cost of notification unless the companies have a
real doubt about the applicability of Article 85(3). Companies
know that in the event of subsequent litigation it would not be
too late to notify to the Commission in order to receive an ex-
emption taking effect from the date of conclusion of the agree-
ment. This ability to notify the Commission in the event of sub-
sequent litigation will allow the Commission to reduce the a pri-
ori control system based on notifications and to concentrate,
together with the competition authorities of Member States, on
the more important cases, thereby increasing the efficiency of
the EC competition rules. The objective is to reduce enforce-
ment costs for industry and to eliminate as far as possible notifi-
cations that do not raise any serious competition problems.
2. Horizontal Restraints
The Commission is also reviewing its policy on horizontal
cooperation agreements. Originally, the review was started as a
complement to the exercise on vertical restraints and in the light
of the expiring block exemption regulations on specialization 36
and research and development. 37 Meanwhile, the validity of
these two regulations has been extended by three years to the
end of the year 2000, which will give us sufficient time for this
review exercise. Though the project's focus in the beginning
was on R&D and specialization agreements, it soon became clear
that we had to include in the review other notices such as the
1968 Notice on Cooperation Agreements, 38 the 1979 Notice on
Sub-Contracting Agreements,3" and the 1993 Notice on Co-oper-
ative Joint Ventures.4" The Commission found that inevitably it
36. Commission Regulation No. 417/85 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the
Treaty to Categories of Specialization Agreements, O.J. L 53/1 (1985).
37. Commission Regulation No. 418/85 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the
Treaty to Categories of Research and Development Agreements, O.J. L 53/1 (1985).
38. Commission Notice concerning agreements, decisions, and concerted prac-
tices in the field of cooperation between enterprises, O.J. C 75/3 (1968), corrected version
in O.J. C 84/14 (1968).
39. Commission Notice, O.J. C 1/2 (1979).
40. Commission Notice, O.J. C 43/2 (1993).
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would have to look into other types of horizontal cooperation
not covered by any regulations or notices such as joint buying,
joint selling, and standardization agreements.
During 1997, an in-depth fact finding with European indus-
try and Member States as well as a survey of literature and case
law was carried out. The results revealed a number of points.
First, horizontal cooperation is increasingly important for indus-
try due to globalization and more dynamic markets. Second, the
types of cooperation activities have changed over the last decade.
For example, there are more joint ventures and outsourcing of
R&D. Third, industry recognizes that, although horizontal coop-
eration can bring about efficiencies, such cooperation can also
cause competition problems such as collusion between the coop-
erating partners or foreclosure/exclusion of competitors. In
this context companies noted that the market power of the co-
operating parties is an important assessment criterion. Finally,
Community competition rules are criticized as rather unclear,
narrow, and partly outdated.
The major aims of the review are to ensure clarity and con-
sistency of policy. The current rules and notices are rather frag-
mented and are based on the legal forms of cooperation agree-
ments. We, therefore, would like to come up with a more com-
prehensive approach that provides for an analytical framework
for the assessment of horizontal cooperation in general. Greater
emphasis should be put on economic criteria in order to distin-
guish between neutral or procompetitive agreements and an-
ticompetitive ones. In this context, it is intended to increase
transparency and to give better guidance to industry.
For certain types of agreements that are generally consid-
ered to be less restrictive, safe havens defined in terms of the
combined market shares of the participating undertakings could
be established. They could be complemented by black lists of
certain per se prohibited behaviour. Within these clearly defined
safe havens, undertakings would not have to engage in any fur-
ther assessment of the validity of their agreements under the EC
competition rules. For agreements falling above the market
share threshold and for agreements of another, generally more
restrictive type, the Commission would give guidance about how
it would assess Articles 85(1), 85(3), and 86 in certain circum-
stances.
1999]
876 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:853
Moreover, as far as the implementation of this approach is
concerned, one could imagine two options. The first would con-
sist of a block exemption regulation applicable to the mentioned
less harmful agreements up to the market share cap plus guide-
lines published by the Commission about its policy towards all
other cases. Alternatively, the Commission could refrain from
producing any new block exemption regulation after the current
ones expire and instead rely' exclusively on guidelines.
We are still in the initial phase of discussions about future
orientations in this area and the models that I just sketched are
only some of many options to be examined. Whatever the re-
sults, the public will be consulted, but probably not before 1999.
B. The Orientation of Further Reforms
In the field of Articles 85 and 86, it is of particular urgency
to look at the division of enforcement competences and at a pos-
sible reform of the procedural framework laid down in Regula-
tion 17. For perhaps a too long time, this was taboo for the
Commission. Today, it is a major task that still lies ahead of us.
The debate, however, is not new. Different concepts have al-
ready been presented. We have not yet reached any preliminary
conclusion. The following elements and options will certainly
require further discussion.
C. Increased Decentralization in the Application of EC Competition
Law and Closer' Cooperation Between the Commission and
National Competition Authorities/Courts
Increased decentralization in the application of EC Compe-
tition Law and closer cooperation between the Commission and
national competition authorities or courts is a key element that
will certainly be part of any new framework as it is both necessary
and efficiency enhancing. More decentralization is necessary be-
cause the Commission alone could never guarantee effective
protection against restrictions of competition. The Commission
and national bodies have to cooperate and a common competi-
tion culture has to be developed. This cannot be ordered from
the top by the Commission, but will have to grow all over the
European Union. An increasing involvement of national bodies
in the application of Community rules is already providing a fer-
tile ground for such development. Moreover, cooperation be-
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tween competition authorities is useful as it will promote an ever
more similar control practice. Increased decentralization will
also depend on the extent to which complainants and litigants
can have the realistic expectation that national competition au-
thorities and courts are able fully to solve the problems
presented to them. Finally, increased decentralization and
closer cooperation will promote the Community-wide accept-
ance of EC competition rules, which is an obvious problem in a
further enlarged Europe. A number of obstacles to an efficient
decentralization and closer cooperation, however, still remain.
The issues to be tackled immediately are discussed below.
1. National Authorities' Power to Apply Articles 85(1) and 86
In each Member State, national competition authorities
should be empowered to apply Articles 85(1) and 86. At the mo-
ment, the national competition authorities 'of only eight Mem-
ber States have such power. The new Dutch competition author-
ity joined this club on January 1, 1998. The group of seven
Member States that still do not grant their competition authori-
ties this power, might shrink in the foreseeable future. In Swe-
den there is a concrete reform bill, and in Luxembourg and
Denmark a certain prospect exists that the relevant laws might
be amended within the next two years. There are no such re-
form plans in Austria, Finland, and Ireland, and unfortunately
the U.K. Government could not be convinced to foresee such
power in the still pending U.K. Competition Law Bill. The com-
petition authorities of these Member States can thus only apply
their national competition law even in cases that involve effect
on trade between Member States.
2. One Single Set of Substantive Rules for Cases with Effect on
Interstate Trade, i.e., the EC Competition Rules
In the current system, in cases with effect on trade between
Member States, national and EC competition law can be applied
in parallel by national competition authorities and the Commis-
sion. Neither Regulation 17 nor the Commission's 1997 Cooper-
ation Notice41 could prohibit national competition authorities
41. Commission Notice on Co-operation between national Competition Authori-
ties and the Commission in handling cases falling within the scope of Articles 85 or 86
of the EC Treaty, 0J. C 313/3 (1997).
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from taking up a case on the basis of national law even if the
Commission is dealing with it on the basis of Community law.
The major difficulties arising from such a system of double con-
trol have been solved in the sense that the application of na-
tional law should not prejudice the coherent application of the
EC competition rules throughout the Community and should re-
spect the measures adopted for the enforcement of these rules.42
For the sake of clarity and efficiency, it nevertheless seems in the
interest of all the parties involved, competition authorities and
courts as well as economic operators, to aim for a system in
which only one set of substantive competition rules exists for
cases with an effect on interstate trade. Logically, these would be
the EC rules. This system would provide the best guarantee for a
coherent application of the competition rules by different deci-
sion-makers. This is essential for promoting an integrated inter-
nal market where economic operators do not wish to be exposed
to a diversity of national regulations and the risks of divergent
treatment of similar cases.
The new system will have to be accompanied by a clear divi-
sion of work between national competition authorities and the
Commission. National authorities would normally deal with all
cases involving effect on interstate trade, the effects of which
have a center of gravity confined to one Member State. Such a
division of labor presupposes that all Member States empower
their competition authorities to apply EC competition law.
3. Instruments to Ensure Coherence in the Application of the
EC Competition Rules
Various instruments should be introduced to ensure coher-
ence in the application of EC competition rules. The present
cooperation between national competition authorities and the
Commission should be developed into a true network of compe-
tition authorities with binding obligations of information and of
cooperation. In addition, the Commission should provide more
guidance for national authorities and courts on the interpreta-
tion and application of Articles 85 and 86. This guidance can be
achieved through more guidelines published by the Commis-
sion, more leading decisions by the Commission, and possibly
the presence of the Commission as amicus curiae in national pro-
42. See id. points 5, 16-22.
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cedures. Like in the present system, the Court of First Instance
and the Court ofJustice will maintain the final word on the valid-
ity of decisions taken by the Commission and on the interpreta-
tion of EC competition law that is applied in national judicial
proceedings.
D. The Central Open Question: Modernization of Regulation 17
1. The Remaining Problems
Even if we solve all the issues that I just mentioned, we re-
main with several problems. It is foreseeable that increased de-
centralization of the kind just described-although being abso-
lutely necessary-will not solve all the problems in the area of
Article 85. In particular, two basic problems, which are interre-
lated, will remain.
a. The Commission Works Far Too Reactively
The Commission spends too much time dealing with what
industry presents to it, in particular by way of notifications for
exemption under Article 85(3), which often are of little interest
from a competition policy point of view. Instead, the Commis-
sion should be enabled to adopt a more proactive approach,
concentrating on issues that are important for competition pol-
icy and that should be taken up ex officio or on the basis of com-
plaints. In particular, I think of cartels, where today our efforts
are by far insufficient.
b. The Current System of Regulation 17 Is Becoming
Inappropriate
Due to the particularly wide scope of Article 85(1), a great
number of agreements require exemption under Article 85(3)
in order to be legally enforceable. Consequently, for economic
operators concerned about legal certainty, there is a substantial
incentive to seek clarification upon the application of Article
85(3).
On this basis, Regulation 17 essentially does two things.
First, for participants to an agreement who are concerned about
legal certainty, Regulation 17 turns the incentive to have the ap-
plicability of Article 85(3) clarified into a quasi-obligation to no-
tify by stipulating in its Article 6(1) that an exemption cannot
take effect before the date of notification. In order to avoid the
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risk of a period in which the agreement is irrevocably void, even
though it might later have been exempted, parties will tend to
notify on the date of the conclusion of their agreement.
Second, Regulation 17 sets a clear limit to any effort of de-
centralization by stipulating in its Article 9(1) that the Commis-
sion shall have the sole power to grant an exemption pursuant to
Article 85(3). The consequences of the Commission's exemp-
tion monopoly are the following. First, it prevents national com-
petition authorities and courts from making a full assessment,
including positive aspects, of a restrictive agreement. Second, it
leads to excessively centralized application in Brussels. Third, it
stimulates the application of national competition law instead of
EC competition law in cases with effect on interstate trade.
2. What Are Possible Solutions?
There are certainly many options for tackling the remaining
basic problems of the current system. All of them will have to be
analyzed and discussed very carefully.
a. "Rule-of-reason" Approach in Interpreting Article 85(1)
As already indicated, one of the reasons for the large
number of notifications for exemption lies in the fact that the
prohibition under Article 85(1) has traditionally been inter-
preted by the Commission and the Court in a particularly wide
manner. This interpretation is partly due to a too legalistic ap-
proach in the past. And it is also due to the division within Arti-
cle 85 under which the anticompetitive effects are mainly as-
sessed under paragraph one while the procompetitive effects are
assessed and weighed against the anticompetitive effects under
paragraph three.
Under a rule-of-reason approach, one could imagine weigh-
ing many of the procompetitive and anticompetitive elements of
an agreement already within Article 85(1). This type of balanc-
ing would have to go together with a shift from a legalistic, form-
based approach to a more economic approach, which already
characterizes our current policy reform concerning vertical re-
straints. As a result, fewer agreements would be caught by Arti-
cle 85(1), and a reduction in the number of notifications could
be achieved without even amending Regulation 17.
Apart from a few allusions to rule-of-reason considerations
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under the notion of appreciable restriction of competition, the
Commission has not followed this approach so far. Its policy
rather was to maintain the division between Articles 85(1) and
85(3). Likewise, in the case law of the Court, only limited allu-
sions to this principle can be found.4 3 It. would, however, not be
impossible for the Commission gradually to change its policy
while analyzing closely how the Court of Justice reacts. In other
areas, most markedly in free movement of goods through the
jurisprudence starting with the Keck judgment in 1993, 44 the
Court has been willing to renounce from interpreting certain
provisions in a way that had proved to be too wide and that had
not really served the objectives pursued by them.
On the other hand, the rule-of-reason approach finds its
limits in the EC Treaty, which has provided for the separation
into Articles 85(1) and 85(3). A rule-of-reason could easily de-
prive Article 85(3) of its function and amount to an illicit factual
amendment of the Treaty. The power to amend the Treaty
solely lies with the Member States.
Another drawback is that a switch to a rule-of-reason ap-
proach, which the Commission could only implement gradually,
i.e., step by step, would probably be too slow to provide effective
remedies for the weaknesses of the present system. Moreover, in
such a process, the Commission would have limited steering
powers, as the evolution of this approach would depend on con-
firmation by the Court of Justice, which is difficult to predict.
b. Simplification of Procedures
As another option, one could try to further streamline the
procedures. The procedure for rejection of complaints could be
simplified. Notifications for exemption could in unproblematic
cases end with abbreviated formal decisions modelled on the Ar-
ticle 6(1) (b) decisions under the Merger Regulation. In com-
parison with the present comfort letter practice, such decisions
would offer more legal certainty by taking effect against every-
body. This, however, could lead to the paradox of even increas-
ing the number of notifications. Likewise, realistically speaking,
43. Nungesser and Eisele v. Commission, Case 258/78, [1982] E.C.R. 2015, [1983]
1 C.M.L.R. 278; Pronuptia v. Schiligalis, Case 161/84, [1986] E.C.R. 353, [1986] 1
C.M.L.R. 414.
44. Keck and Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267-68/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6097, 1-6131,
14, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 101, 125.
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the introduction of time limits for decisions upon Article 85(3)
to be taken by the Commission would rather increase the
number of notifications. I do not want to be misunderstood on
this point: I do not plead Directorate General IV's failure to
deal with certain notifications swiftly as an argument against
time limits. In contrast, however, to the further increasing but
nevertheless limited number of mergers that fall under the
Merger Regulation every year (probably 200 cases in 1998), one
simply has to acknowledge that the number of agreements and
concerted practices falling under Article 85(1), and therefore
calling for an assessment under Article 85(3), is much higher.
And it will significantly further increase in an enlarged Commu-
nity of twenty to twenty-five Member States. The experience of
the last decades and budgetary perspectives for the future make
us believe that Member States will never give Directorate Gen-
eral IV sufficient resources to deal with all cases of notification
under the present system.
c. Power to Exempt also for National Cartel Authorities
A further option would be to give the power to exempt
under Article 85(3) also to national cartel authorities. This
question has been the subject of some heated debate in the last
years. Such a model would maintain the excessively large notifi-
cation practice, but would liberate the Commission from a
number of notifications that could adequately be dealt with by
national authorities. As a consequence, the Commission would
gain space for the above-mentioned more proactive approach in
pursuing its policy in cases of Community-wide interest. Use
could be made of the more effective and more far-reaching in-
vestigative powers that some national competition authorities
have. Moreover, decisions would be made nearer to the compa-
nies that have to comply with them.
It is undeniable, however, that a decentralization of Article
85 (3) " would also involve certain risks and drawbacks. First, the
power to exempt under Article 85(3) is something genuinely dif-
ferent from the power to prohibit under Article 85(1). There
would always be a danger of divergent decisions under Article
85(3) being taken by different national authorities in similar sit-
45. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 85(3), OJ. C 224/1, at 28 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 626.
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uations. Second, exemption decisions taken by the competition
authority of a Member State would be of limited value for eco-
nomic operators if they could not take effect outside the terri-
tory of that Member State. Whether this is possible seems at
least questionable.
d. Other Solutions
Other solutions and combinations of solutions could be
considered. They would require more imagination and more
courage than the options just described above. One starting
point could be to state that the Commission should concentrate
on detecting and prohibiting restrictions of competition instead
of dealing with notifications for exemption under Article 85(3).
The principal aim could be not to distribute the treatment of
notifications for exemption between national competition au-
thorities and the Commission, but to reduce the number of
these notifications substantially.
Under this approach the separation of Article 85 into para-
graph one and paragraph three on the level of the EC Treaty
would not have to be changed. The issues that one would have
to discuss rather concern Regulation 17. In 1962, this regulation
established a system that separates the enforcement of Article
85(1) from that of Article 85(3) and subjects the latter to an
administrative decision to be taken by one central authority'at
the end of a notification procedure. For those seeking legal cer-
tainty and enforceability of their agreements, Regulation 17 es-
tablishes a quasi-obligation to notify to the Commission because
there can be no exemption decision without notification.
The choice of such a centralized authorization system based
on quasi-compulsory notifications to the Commission can easily
be explained by the circumstances prevailing in 1962. At that
time, the Commission had hardly any information about existing
agreements and practices. The Commission had not yet devel-
oped a decision-making practice and the judgments by the Euro-
pean Court ofJustice were very few in number. Thus, there were
practically no precedents set by European institutions that could
have guided national authorities and courts. Moreover, in the
Member States little to no competition legislation existed, very
few competition authorities were in place, and hardly any of
them was really active. Moreover, complainants would not have
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turned to the Commission if it had not taken the leading role in
the enforcement of Article 85.
It could be argued that thirty-six years later, circumstances
have largely changed and that the centralized authorization sys-
tem based on quasi-compulsory notifications to the Commission
has possibly become excessive. Today, there is a substantial body
of case law created by the Commission and the Court of Justice
that provides guidance in many questions. The existence and
power of the Commission is well known to complainants. And
finally, the impact of the notification system on compliance with
Article 85 has been shown to have reached its limits where it
comes to the most serious restrictions of competition. They are
usually carried out intentionally and would therefore not be no-
tified to the Commission even under a fully-fledged system of
compulsory notifications.
CONCLUSION
With regard to the modernization of Regulation 17, today it
would obviously be premature to make a choice between any of
the options that I have sketched in the foregoing. But I can say
that-in order to achieve the objectives that we have to pursue-
it will probably be necessary to touch on all or most of the pa-
rameters of reform that I outlined in this presentation. This will
be the fascinating challenge that we have to tackle in the near
future.
